University of Massachusetts Law Review
Volume 17

Issue 2

Article 4

Rage Against the Machine: Reducing Robocall Abuse to Protect
At-Risk Consumers
Nicole Egan

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umassd.edu/umlr
Part of the Communications Law Commons, and the Consumer Protection Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Egan, Nicole () "Rage Against the Machine: Reducing Robocall Abuse to Protect At-Risk Consumers,"
University of Massachusetts Law Review: Vol. 17: Iss. 2, Article 4.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.umassd.edu/umlr/vol17/iss2/4

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository @ University of Massachusetts
School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Massachusetts Law Review by an authorized
editor of Scholarship Repository @ University of Massachusetts School of Law.
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ABSTRACT
For most people, robocalls are nothing more than an annoying side-effect of owning a
cell phone today. But a successful robocall scheme is still capable of wreaking
financial and psychological havoc on its victims. Senior citizens and cognitively
impaired individuals are often targeted by fraudulent phone calls or texts because they
may have trouble understanding how to identify and protect themselves from robocall
abuse. This Note proposes a collaborative solution to this problem by calling on the
judiciary and legislatures to minimize the amount of robocalls received by American
telephone consumers. By adopting a broader understanding of the law and enacting
stricter regulatory measures concerning automated calls and text messages, this Note
theorizes that the unfair impact of robocalls on these targeted communities would
decrease. After all, robocalls are a favorite tool used to illegally defraud unwitting
recipients, many of whom are elderly or cognitively harmed. Rather than tasking
telephone consumers with protecting themselves from phone fraud, the government
should take responsibility and stop robocallers from evading the law in the first place.
AUTHOR’S NOTE
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INTRODUCTION

A

t a time when the nation is unequivocally divided, there is at least
one thing that most Americans agree on—putting an end to those
incessant, unwanted automated phone calls, i.e. “robocalls.” Robocalls
have evolved into the new “scourge of modern civilization” over the
past decade, and while some Americans are tech-savvy enough to block
or ignore them, many people are not able to protect themselves in this
way.1 Thus, certain vulnerable populations are unfairly targeted by
nefarious callers, and are therefore more likely to become victims of
fraudulent phone schemes.2 So the next time you forward “Unknown
Caller” straight to voicemail, you may find yourself wondering: how is
this still legal?
The short answer is: it isn’t legal. 3 In fact, a federal statute generally
bars the use of automatic dialing equipment to send unsolicited calls or
text messages.4 However, this 1990s era law is riddled with legal
loopholes and its application is due for an upgrade. 5 The law, called the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), was originally enacted in
1991 to stop telemarketers from placing bothersome calls to residential
landlines.6 Since then, however, the courts have interpreted the statute
so narrowly that its effect has diminished considerably. 7 In fairness, not
all robocalls are bad. For example, schools use them to notify students
about closures, health care offices use them to confirm appointments,
and local governments use them to notify residents of public

1

2

3
4
5

6
7

Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 227) (explaining how consumers are infuriated by the
proliferation of unwanted, invasive telemarketing calls they receive at home); see
discussion infra Part II (detailing how consumers are infuriated by the proliferation of
unwanted, invasive telemarketing calls they receive at home).
See JOSEPH J. SIMONS ET AL., FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING OLDER CONSUMERS 2
(2020), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/protecting-older-consumers2019-2020-report-federal-trade-commission/p144400_protecting_older_adults_report_
2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/V8U3-M9EM].
See 47 U.S.C. § 227.
Id.
See Laura A. Mazzuchetti et al., Supreme Court Defines ATDS Under the TCPA,
KELLEYDRYE (Apr. 2, 2021), https://www.adlawaccess.com/2021/04/articles/supremecourt-ruled-that-the-definition-of-an-automatic-telephone-dialing-system-under-the-tcpais-limited-by-the-plain-grammar-of-the-statute-itself
[https://perma.cc/DK3V-NPDK]
(describing the impact of narrowly-tailored TCPA decisions).
See discussion infra Part II.
See, e.g., Hoover v. Monarch Recovery Mgmt., 888 F. Supp. 2d 589, 605 (E.D. Pa. 2012)
(holding that debt collector’s calls to consumer were exempt from the TCPA).
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emergencies.8 However, the narrow rulings of the courts regarding the
scope of the TCPA have impliedly authorized many types of automated
calls to continue, regardless of how much the person on the receiving
end wants them to stop.
That is not to say that the U.S. has done nothing to try and stop the
onslaught of robocalls. Guidance from the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC), for example, encourages consumers to install spam
blocker apps on their phones, ignore calls from unknown numbers,
report spam calls for tracking in their internal database, and add their
numbers to the National Do Not Call Registry.9 Recently, the FCC also
enacted the nation’s most severe robocall crackdown measure to date:
the “STIR/SHAKEN framework.” (And no, despite its acronym, the
FCC is not encouraging consumers to simply drink robocall pain
away.)10 This mandate requires phone companies to reduce the
likelihood of robocallers successfully “spoofing” a recognizable
number, such as when a call appears to originate from a consumer’s
local area code, or from an official government agency—frequently the
Internal Revenue Service or the Social Security Administration, for
example.11 Nevertheless, even with STIR/SHAKEN in place, the
robocall assault continues, and Americans are left to deal not only with
the devastating financial effects of the government’s failure to act, but
also with the crushing physical and emotional consequences of robocall
abuse.12
This Note discusses potential solutions to this problem. The
Supreme Court and government agencies both need to play a role in
minimizing the number of robocalls received by American telephone
8

9

10

11
12

See, e.g., Latner v. Mount Sinai Health Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 52, 54-55 (2nd Cir. 2018)
(holding flu shot reminder texts did not violate the TCPA); Blackboard, Inc., 31 F.C.C.
Rcd. 9054 (2016), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-16-88A1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8D4X-6Q8S] (confirming that schools may lawfully make robocalls and
send automated texts to student family wireless phones pursuant to “emergency purpose”
exception without violating the TCPA).
Stop Unwanted Robocalls and Texts, FED. COMMC’N. COMM’N. (Nov. 12, 2020),
https://www.fcc.gov/sites/default/files/stop_unwanted_robocalls_and_texts.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MUE4-KTVA] [hereinafter Unwanted Robocalls].
See Combating Spoofed Robocalls with Caller ID Authentication, FED. COMMC’N.
COMM’N. https://www.fcc.gov/call-authentication [https://perma.cc/H5XW-JZ3T] [hereinafter Combating Spoofed Robocalls]; see also infra Part III-C.
See Combating Spoofed Robocalls, supra note 10.
Id. (explaining how caller ID authentication will make Americans feel more comfortable
trusting that the information they receive from caller ID is accurate); see also FCC Data
Spotlight: Top Five Unwanted Call Complaints, FED. COMMC’N. COMM’N. (Mar. 4, 2021),
https://www.fcc.gov/fcc-data-spotlighttop-five-unwanted-call-complaints [https://perma.c
c/UR7H-ZVFY] (explaining the increasing prevalence of robocall complaints) [hereinafter
FCC Data Spotlight].

2022

Rage Against the Machine

215

consumers. Reducing the number of robocalls will decrease the amount
of people who fall victim to robocall fraud schemes. Part I provides
background for the assertion that elderly and cognitively impaired
populations are more likely to become victims of robocall fraud. Part II
discusses the evolution of the TCPA and why it fails to meet its
objective. It also proposes ideas for applying the law to accomplish its
intended goal: protecting consumers from harassing phone calls. Part III
reviews agency-led robocall regulations and highlights the changes that
should be made to increase their effectiveness. Part IV suggests
alternative solutions. More specifically, the United States should adopt
solutions from other countries, by imposing stricter identification
requirements and restricting the sale of personal information by data
brokers, including phone numbers. This Note concludes by
reemphasizing the importance of a corroborated effort to mitigate
robocalls. Robocalls are not just a nuisance; they are a weapon that
scammers use to target vulnerable communities.
I. THE TARGETED COMMUNITY
When landlines were a permanent fixture in most homes, it was
actually considered bad etiquette to ignore a ringing telephone.13
However, in recent years, people have widely stopped answering their
phones.14 Sometimes, this is because the recipient fears a scam call is
waiting for them on the other end.15 Other times, the recipient may
simply be following guidelines to avoid calls from unknown numbers,
or prefer using a different method of communication. 16 Either way, the
correlation between an increased rate of robocalls and a decreased rate
of answered calls is hard to ignore. 17 And frankly, it is no wonder people
don’t want to pick up their phones.

13

14
15

16
17

Alexis C. Madrigal, Why No One Answers Their Phone Anymore, THE ATLANTIC
(May 31, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/05/ring-ring-ringring/561545 [https://perma.cc/ZPX3-RKLK].
Id.
Id.; see also Debra Dolan, Lost Hiker Ignores Rescue Calls Because They ‘Didn’t
Recognize the Number’, WHSV (Oct. 26, 2021, 11:31 AM), https://www.whsv.com /2021
/10/26/lost-hiker-ignores-rescue-calls-because-they-didnt-recognize-number [https://perm
a.cc/998K-AH6W] (telling the story of a lost hiker who ignored his rescuers’ calls thinking
they were spam and eventually emerged unharmed, but after his ordeal, his rescuers
implored the public to “please answer the phone; it may be a search and rescue team trying
to confirm you’re safe . . . .”).
Madrigal, supra note 13.
Id.
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Robocalls are not only a nuisance and an invasion of privacy, but
they also present a real danger to their most susceptible victims.18
According to research studies, people who are sixty-five years or older
are 34% more likely to lose money in a scam than someone in their
forties.19 But the gap is probably much wider than that: according to one
estimate, only one in forty-four fraud victims actually report what
happened to them because they are either embarrassed or fearful of
losing control of their financial freedom.20 Even in the unlikely event
that a robocall fraud victim does decide to take legal action against their
offender, it is doubtful they can successfully assert an actionable claim
for fraud.
Fraud is a broad cause of action encompassing many types of
deceitful activity, including the use of a phone to intentionally defraud
someone.21 Usually, to succeed in a fraud action, it must be proven that
the defendant purposefully misrepresented facts in order to intentionally
deceive the victim and the victim must be shown to have detrimentally
relied on those misrepresentations.22 In the vast majority of robocall
fraud schemes, however, the injured party does not know who to sue
because robocallers shield their identities and change their numbers
often to avoid being traced.23 Consequently, robocall fraud victims often
have no recourse available to recover their losses, unless they are
somehow able to track down their perpetrator. 24 Therefore, the United
States must be proactive in exploring preventive measures designed to
reduce the number of fraudulent phone scams. In other words, if the
18

19
20

See, e.g., Misty Carter, Top 10 Scams Targeting Seniors, ASS’N. OF CERTIFIED FRAUD
EXAMINERS INSIGHTS, https://www.acfeinsights.com/acfe-insights/2018/2/23/the-top-10scams-targeting-seniors [https://perma.cc/QYC4-GMAM]; Kelley Holland, These
Scammers Are Targeting Your Elderly Parents, CNBC (Feb. 17, 2015, 4:38 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2015/02/17/these-scammers-are-targeting-your-elderlyparents.html [https://perma.cc/XG7H-DDFA].
Holland, supra note 18.
Id.

21

Mark Theoharis, Laws on Fraud, CRIM. DEF. LAW., https://www.criminaldefenselawyer.com/
crime-penalties/federal/Fraud.htm [https://perma.cc/7K4A-PEKH] (describing typical criminal
and civil fraud claims, including wire fraud, which occurs whenever a person uses a telephone
and other electronic communication devices to carry out an act of fraud).

22

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM § 9 (AM. LAW INST. 2020) (“One
who fraudulently makes a material misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention, or law, for
the purpose of inducing another to act or refrain from acting, is subject to liability for
economic loss caused by the other’s justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation.”).
Simon van Zuylen-Wood, How Robo-Callers Outwitted the Government and Completely
Wrecked the Do Not Call List, WASH. POST (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/lifestyle/magazine/how-robo-call-moguls-outwitted-the-government-andcompletely-wrecked-the-do-not-call-list/2018/01/09/52c769b6-df7a-11e7-bbd09dfb2e37492a_story.html [https://perma.cc/9KVX-L2KJ].
Id.

23

24
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number of robocalls received by telephone consumers can be decreased
on the front end by legislative or other means, then the amount of people
who succumb to fraudulent robocalls would also decrease.
Studies also show that people with cognitive impairments (like
Alzheimer’s, dementia, or Traumatic Brain Injuries (TBIs)) are more
likely to become victims of financial fraud.25 In fact, “scam
susceptibility” is one of the earliest signs that an individual is
experiencing a decline in their cognitive awareness, and may even be an
early indicator of dementia.26 Thus, the most common robocall fraud
target is a cognitively impaired, elderly person. 27 So to members of this
distinct group, robocalls are so much more than just a mundane source
of irritation that cannot be easily blocked or ignored.
Consider, for example, what Marjorie Jones endured. 28 Jones was
eighty-two years old when she took her own life after losing the entirety
of her savings to phone scammers masquerading as representatives from
government agencies.29 During a congressional hearing regarding the
mortifying consequences of inadequate robocall regulation, Jones’s
granddaughter testified that her grandmother “had taken out a reverse
mortgage on her home and . . . died with $69 in her bank account.” 30
Jones’s story is truly heartbreaking, and her courageous granddaughter
shared it hoping to prevent this from happening to anyone else. 31 Sadly,
the Jones family are not the only ones forced to grapple with this
particularly cruel form of grief.

25

26
27
28

29
30
31

Scam Susceptibility May Signal Risk for Cognitive Decline, NAT’L INST. ON AGING (Jun. 6,
2019), https://www.nia.nih.gov/news/scam-susceptibility-may-signal-risk-cognitive-decl
ine [https://perma.cc/5Q53-YKAG]. Unlike Alzheimer’s or dementia, however, age is not
a factor when it comes to TBIs. TBIs can occur at any age, and at least 1.5 million
individuals are affected by TBIs each year in the United States. Some TBI sufferers
experience cognitive impairments as a result of their injury, implying that people with TBIs
are also at risk, regardless of age. See Hal S. Wortzel & David B. Arciniegas, Treatment of
Post-Traumatic Cognitive Impairments, 14 CURRENT TREATMENT OPTIONS NEUROLOGY
493, 494 (2012).
NAT’L INST. ON AGING, supra note 25.
See id.
Steve Price, Stop the Calls: Robocallers Trick Grandmother Out of Life Savings, CBS8
(May 12, 2021, 11:33 PM), https://www.cbs8.com/article/news/investigations/robocalls
/robocalls-featured/stop-the-calls-robocallers-trick-grandmother-out-of-life-savings/5095c84adac-729e-4b2a-ac54-0be16e1e475a [https://perma.cc/VS9D-SMSR].
Id.
Id.
Id.

218

UMass Law Review

v. 17 | 212

Another tragic case is that of Albert Poland, Jr. 32 Poland was a senior
citizen with Alzheimer’s and dementia. 33 In the months prior to his
death, Poland was receiving up to fifty spam calls a day. 34 Even in his
suicide note, Poland cautioned his wife “not to spend much on his
funeral” because he was expecting to receive a $2 million payout the
next day.35 Of course, the money never came, and the people who
robbed Poland and his wife of sixty-two years of all their money have
not been held accountable to this day. 36 This is an awful but not
uncommon result: many robocall scammers, just like those who
deceived Mr. Poland, are never found, and collectively get away with
stealing billions of dollars from Americans every year. 37
Unsurprisingly, robocall-related complaints took the number one
spot on the FCC’s 2020 consumer complaint list.38 During that same
year, over forty-five billion robocalls were made nationwide,39 resulting
in Americans losing almost $30 billion to phone scammers. 40 Despite
the massive cost and potentially life-altering consequences of relentless
robocall abuse—and the government’s admission that older adults are
“[u]nfortunately . . . targeted or disproportionately affected” by
robocall scams—the U.S. still has not figured out how to adequately
regulate them.41 In 2021, consumers reported receiving over fifty billion
robocalls—exceeding the prior year’s figure by over four billion. 42 And
at least one-third of those calls are estimated to be scams. 43

32

33
34
35
36
37

38
39
40
41
42
43

Wayne Drash, Driven to Death by Phone Scammers, CNN (Oct. 7, 2015, 9:31 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2015/10/07/us/jamaica-lottery-scam-suicide/index.html
[https://perma.cc/8QD3-XBBE].
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Megan Leonhardt, Americans Lost $29.8 Billion to Phone Scams Alone Over the Past Year,
CNBC (Jun. 29, 2021, 9:00 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/29/americans-lostbillions-of-dollars-to-phone-scams-over-the-past-year.html
[https://perma.cc/K9BN3A4D].
FCC Data Spotlight, supra note 12.
Historical Robocalls by Time, YOUMAIL ROBOCALL INDEX, https://robocallindex.com
/history/time [https://perma.cc/5XCD-WGKE].
Leonhardt, supra note 37.
SIMONS ET AL., supra note 2.
YOUMAIL ROBOCALL INDEX, supra note 39.
U.S. Phones Were Hit by More than 50 Billion Robocalls in 2021, Says YouMail Robocall
Index, PR NEWSWIRE (Jan. 6, 2022), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/usphones-were-hit-by-more-than-50-billion-robocalls-in-2021-says-youmail-robocallindex-301455319.html [https://perma.cc/P3E3-UT4F].
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II. THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
A. The Evolution of the TCPA
Congress originally proposed the TCPA as a way to ban
telemarketing calls, which, at the time, were referred to as “the scourge
of modern civilization.”44 As the authors of the proposed bill fervently
explained, “owning a telephone does not give the world the right and
privilege to assault the consumer with machine-generated telephone
calls.”45 Referring to the increased volume of sales calls as a “nuisance
and an invasion of . . . privacy,” the proposed bill sought to address the
high amount of FCC complaints about them.46 As a result, Congress
announced that banning automated calls by statute was the “only
effective means of protecting telephone consumers,” and the proposed
bill swiftly became law in 1991.47
On its face, the TCPA is fairly straightforward. The statute is not
cluttered with unnecessary legalese or ambiguous language; actually, it
reads quite clearly and succinctly.48 The pertinent part of the statute
reads as follows: “It shall be unlawful for any person within the United
States . . . to make any call (other than a call made for emergency
purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party)
using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial
prerecorded voice . . . .”49 Thus, the law should make it illegal to do
exactly what it plainly says is unlawful: in other words, to place
automated calls to American residents without their consent. 50 Over
time, the statute has been interpreted to prohibit the automatic sending
of unsolicited text messages as well.51 But in application, the statute is
not as straightforward as it appears. As the old saying goes, “the devil
is in the details,” and in the TCPA, he is hiding out in the definition of
an “automatic telephone dialing system” (ATDS).
In the thirty years since the TCPA went into effect, technological
advances have made it possible for people to place calls not only from

44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51

137 CONG. REC. S9840-02 (1991) (statement of Sen. Hollings).
Id.
Id.
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, § 2(12), 105 Stat. 2394,
2394-95.
See id. (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227).
47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1).
See id.
Kramer v. Autobytel, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (explaining that
an automatic telephone dialing system “encompasses both voice calls and text calls to
wireless numbers including, for example, short message service (SMS) calls . . .”).
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telephones, but from watches, cars, and even refrigerators. 52 So then,
what exactly is an ATDS? The concept is best understood by way of
example. When using CarPlay® to ask Siri® to compose and send a text
on your behalf, are you not using a robot to automatically send a text for
you?53 What if Siri sends it to the wrong number? Did the unintended
recipient consent? Did you violate the TCPA? Well, hopefully not. But
now you understand the Supreme Court’s dilemma in applying a thirtyyear-old law to a modern-day problem.
B. The ATDS Dilemma in Duguid
In TCPA cases, the question before courts is often whether the calls
or texts at issue were made using an ATDS.54 The Supreme Court’s most
recent interpretation of what exactly constitutes an ATDS under the
TCPA came in Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid. In this case, the plaintiff sued
Facebook after repeatedly receiving automatic two-factor
authentication texts from the company.55 These messages alerted Mr.
Duguid that somebody was attempting to access his Facebook account
from an unknown browser and included a code that he could use to
successfully log back into his account.56 The problem was that Mr.
Duguid never had a Facebook account. He was not the person trying to
log in, nor was he the person who gave Facebook his number, nor was
he the person repeatedly requesting the code.57 Unable to stop the flurry
of robotexts, Mr. Duguid filed suit, arguing that the repetitive texts

52

53

54

55

56
57

See, e.g., Family Hub, SAMSUNG, https://www.samsung.com/us/explore/family-hub-refri
gerator/overview/ [https://perma.cc/WB8H-T94M] (detailing a Samsung refrigerator with
a variety of communication options).
CarPlay® is a way to use iPhone® while driving. See CarPlay, APPLE,
https://www.apple.com/ios/carplay/ [https://perma.cc/ZD9F-8GKK]. Siri® is a virtual
assistant. See Siri, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/siri/ [https://perma.cc/723C-2PHY]. All
trademarks referenced are registered to their respective owners.
See, e.g., Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 141 S. Ct. 1163, 1167 (2021). There are a number of
cases which dealt with the definition of an ATDS. See Gadelhak v. AT&T Servs, Inc., 950
F.3d 458, 460 (7th Cir. 2020); Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC, 904 F.3d 1041, 1043 (9th
Cir. 2018); Dominguez v. Yahoo, Inc., 894 F.3d 116, 117-18 (3rd Cir. 2018).
Facebook, 141 S. Ct. at 1168; see also Linda Rosencrance et al., Two-Factor
Authentication (2FA), TECHTARGET (Jul. 2021), https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/
definition/two-factor-authentication [https://perma.cc/DH6L-73WZ] (“Two-factor authentication adds an additional layer of security to the authentication process by making it
harder for attackers to gain access to a person’s devices or online accounts because, even
if the victim’s password is hacked, a password alone is not enough to pass the
authentication check.”).
Facebook, 141 S. Ct. at 1168.
Id.
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violated the TCPA because they were being sent to him automatically
without his consent.58 The Court disagreed.59
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court relied on binding
precedent when it determined that the social networking site’s login
notification system—which automatically sends messages when users
attempt to access their accounts from an untrusted browser—did not
meet the definition of an ATDS within the meaning of the TCPA. 60 The
Court reasoned that an ATDS “must have the capacity either to store a
telephone number using a random or sequential generator or to produce
a telephone number using a random or sequential number generator.”61
By way of explanation, even though Mr. Duguid did not give Facebook
his number, somebody did and did so willingly. Thus, the Court held
that because a user willingly gave Facebook the plaintiff’s phone
number when they agreed to their two-step security feature, Facebook’s
system did not randomly generate the number; the system merely
retrieved it from a stored database.62
In deciding that Facebook’s system was not restricted under the
language of the TCPA, the Court limited the scope of what may actually
be considered an ATDS, and potentially provided yet another workaround for scammers to exploit.63 However, regardless of the Court’s
application of precedent and logical reasoning in making its conclusion,
the ruling in Facebook was wrong.64 Mr. Duguid maintained that he
never had a Facebook account, and never gave the company his phone
number.65 He also tried to deactivate the login notification feature to no
avail; because he did not have a Facebook account, he could not access
the user settings to turn them off.66 When Mr. Duguid replied with “off”
58
59
60
61
62
63

64

65
66

Id.
Id. at 1172.
Id.
Id. at 1167 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1172.
See generally Facebook, 141 S. Ct. 1163. See also Palash Basu et al., Dial Away? The
Future of the TCPA After Facebook v. Duguid, 33 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 15, 16
(2021) (speculating that the Facebook decision “potentially freed businesses from
obtaining prior consent for all calls and texts if they are not using an autodialer under the
Supreme Court’s narrower definition” and “might unleash a flurry of undesired
telemarketing calls . . . .”).
See generally Jeffrey F. Gersh & Neil Elan, The Viability of Future TCPA Litigation in
Light of Facebook Inc. v Duguid, NAT’L L. REV. (May 24, 2021), https://www.natlaw
review.com/article/viability-future-tcpa-litigation-light-facebook-inc-v-duguid
[https://perma.cc/6XA7-YN56] (describing even with some benefits to consumers there
are still situations in which robocallers can get around the autodialer ruling in this case).
Duguid v. Facebook, Inc., No. 15-cv-00985-JST, 2017 WL 635117, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb.
16, 2017); see also discussion on data brokers infra Part IV-B.
Duguid, 2017 WL 635117, at *2.
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to Facebook’s texts, Facebook automatically replied with a message
stating, “Facebook texts are now off. Reply on to turn back on.”67 Still,
Facebook continued to send automatic notifications.
If Mr. Duguid had not changed his phone number by this point, he
would likely still be receiving alerts that someone is trying to access his
nonexistent Facebook account.68 This is an unacceptable solution to an
ongoing problem.69 Clearly, the TCPA did not protect Mr. Duguid, a
telephone consumer, from receiving automatic texts that he obviously
did not want to receive. No one should be expected to take such drastic
measures to stop unsolicited communications, only to be invalidated by
the Supreme Court in the end.70 The outcome is therefore misguided and
should not have been satisfactory to the Court. 71
More importantly, however, the Facebook decision highlighted the
biggest problem inherent in all modern TCPA cases. 72 The courts have
become so distracted by overly specific ATDS criterion that they have
“missed the forest for the trees” so to speak.73 In other words, to borrow
the logic from this adage, the Supreme Court’s overly-technical
definition of an ATDS distracts the TCPA from doing the very thing it
was enacted to do, protect people from receiving unwanted calls. 74
C. Revisiting the TCPA’s Purpose in Duran
Although federal district court opinions are not binding upon the
Supreme Court, their decisions provide persuasive arguments for
adopting a broader understanding of the scope of the TCPA.75 For
67
68
69

70
71
72
73
74
75

Id.
See generally Gersh & Elan, supra note 64.
See generally Elisabeth Buchwald, Robocalls Are Biting the Dust, but Get Ready for a Lot
More Spam Texts, MARKETWATCH (Sept. 25, 2021, 12:51 PM), https://www.marketwatch.
com/story/robocalls-are-biting-the-dust-thanks-to-new-technology-but-get-ready-for-alot-more-spam-texts-11632343541 [https://perma.cc/B9QX-YEH2] (explaining how robotexts are still prevalent despite the recent decline in robocalls).
See Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 141 S. Ct. 1163, 1173 (2021).
See generally id.; Gersh & Elan, supra note 64; Buchwald, supra note 69.
See generally Basu et al., supra note 63.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (reversing the previously upheld
constitutionality of the “separate but equal” doctrine ); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100 (1941) (reversing previous rulings regarding the constitutionality of President
Roosevelt’s New Deal); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (overturning a ninetysix-year-old precedent regarding standing for federal court cases); see also David Schultz,
The Supreme Court Has Overturned Precedent Dozens of Times in the Past 60 Years,
Including When it Struck Down Legal Segregation, YAHOO (Sept. 20, 2021),
https://www.yahoo.com/video/supreme-court-overturned-precedent-dozens-123028026
.html [https://perma.cc/WK9N-UF9B] (“The Supreme Court rarely overturns its past
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instance, in Duran v. La Boom Disco, Inc., a nightclub operator was
accused of violating the TCPA by sending hundreds of unsolicited,
automated text messages to the plaintiff.76 Although the nightclub
admitted that it inundated the plaintiff with hundreds of robotexts over
the course of a year and a half, the club nonetheless asserted that their
messages were lawful because they had not been sent by an ATDS.77
After the District Court for the Eastern District of New York agreed with
the nightclub’s position, the case was appealed to the Second Circuit for
review.78
To the district court, the nightclub’s argument was a good one.79
Like Facebook, the nightclub’s system merely stored numbers in a
database that would automatically send messages to people who
previously volunteered a phone number.80 The Second Circuit,
however, was not persuaded by the nightclub’s classic “but it’s not an
ATDS” argument.81 Instead of dredging through prior TCPA cases for
ATDS definitions, like the Supreme Court did in Facebook, the Second
Circuit looked to Congress’s original intent for guidance on how to
decide the case.82
The Duran Court explained that the TCPA’s prohibitions must
“maintain their general deterrent effect on telemarketers.” 83 Thus, “to
effectuate Congress’s intent in passing the [TCPA] as enacted,” the
court held that an ATDS was not necessarily required to randomly
generate phone numbers.84 Further, the court found that the nightclub’s
system for storing and sending texts was automatic, and therefore
exactly the type of ATDS that Congress intended to restrict under the
TCPA.85 Accordingly, the nightclub owner’s text messages violated the
statute, and the Second Circuit ruled in the plaintiff’s favor. 86 However,
while on a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, the
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80
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decisions or precedents. . . . The court has reversed its own constitutional precedents only
145 times - barely one-half of one percent.”).
Duran v. La Boom Disco, Inc., 955 F.3d 279, 281 (2nd Cir. 2020).
Id. at 281-82.
Id. at 282.
Id.
Id. at 281-82.
Id. at 290.
Id. at 285-87.
Id. at 286.
Id. at 287.
Id.
Id. at 290.
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Second Circuit’s judgment was vacated in light of the Facebook
holding.87
Nevertheless, if a lower court can apply the TCPA in a broader
sense, then the Supreme Court can, too.88 At some point, the Supreme
Court started focusing on the wrong thing—the definition of an
ATDS—when it should have been focusing on “protecting telephone
consumers from this nuisance and privacy invasion,” just as Congress
did when they passed the law in the first place. 89 To achieve the TCPA’s
original objective, the Court should broaden the scope of what is illegal
under the statute by expanding the definition of an ATDS. The Court
should also welcome any opportunity to correctly apply a broader
understanding of the TCPA to future cases, which would be supported
by Congress’s original intent, by other federal TCPA decisions, and by
fed up Americans craving peace from never-ending robocallers. 90 Still,
the Court has an even better reason to expand upon the purpose of the
TCPA—at-risk consumers.
When Congress first enacted the TCPA, the negative effect of
machine-generated calls on the elderly or cognitively impaired was not
a consideration for the basis for the legislation. Today, the TCPA could
be expanded to protect at-risk consumers in a way that was not even
contemplated by Congress in the 1990s. If the Supreme Court were to
start analyzing the TCPA as the Second Circuit did in Duran, then the
law could prohibit a wider variety of robocalls or texts, which would
minimize the number of ATDS loopholes available to scammers, and
perhaps even cause consumers to feel sufficiently protected by the
statute. There is no morally justifiable reason for the Court to focus on
the narrow definition of an ATDS.91 Expanding upon the definition can
lessen the likelihood of people falling for robocall fraud, and even
potentially prevent the next Marjorie Jones or Albert Poland, Jr. tragedy
from occurring.92
The Court has, on occasion, departed from stare decisis and
overruled its prior decisions before.93 But a reversal from the Supreme
87
88

89
90
91
92
93

La Boom Disco, Inc. v. Duran, 141 S. Ct. 2509 (2021) (Mem.), overruled by Facebook,
Inc. v. Duguid, 141 S. Ct. 1163 (2021).
See cases cited supra note 75; see also Schultz, supra note 75 (“[J]ustices have become
more willing to reject precedents they think were badly reasoned, simply wrong, or
inconsistent with their own senses of the constitutional framers’ intentions.”).
See Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, § 2(12), 105 Stat.
2394, 2394-95.
See, e.g., Duran v. La Boom Disco, Inc., 955 F.3d 279 (2nd Cir. 2020).
See discussion supra Part I.
Id.
See cases cited supra note 75.
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Court is unlikely to occur any time soon, if at all, because such reversals
are extremely rare.94 In the meantime, legislatures around the country
have turned to different branches of government to enforce the TCPA. 95
Specifically, agencies like the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the
FCC have been tasked with preventing robocall abuse in recent years. 96
III. GOVERNMENT GUIDELINES AND REGULATIONS REGARDING
AUTO DIALERS
A. The National Do Not Call Registry
Cell phones were invented in the 1970s, but evolved into the
everyday necessities they are today in the early 2000s. 97 As cell phones
grew in popularity, spam calls did as well.98 The FTC created the
National Do Not Call Registry (Registry) in 2003 to enforce compliance
with the TCPA.99 By voluntarily adding their number to the Registry, a
consumer was guaranteed that they would not be contacted by
telemarketers.100 Then-President George W. Bush applauded the FTC’s
action, remarking that “When Americans are sitting down for dinner, or
a parent is reading to his or her child . . . the last thing they need is a call
from a stranger with a sales pitch.”101 People were elated, and millions
rushed to add their numbers to the Registry.102 Telemarketers were
sufficiently kept at bay, and Americans were generally pleased with the
government’s solution.103 Only a few years later, however, the Registry
would prove futile at protecting consumers from the emergence of the
telemarketer’s evil successor: the robocall. 104
The Registry is not effective at minimizing the number of robocalls
that Americans receive.105 This is because telemarketing calls were
originally made by living people who manually dialed phone numbers
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See cases cited supra note 75.
See SIMONS ET AL., supra note 2; Unwanted Robocalls, supra note 9.
See sources cited supra note 95.
Alexander Trowbridge, Evolution of the Phone: From the First Call to the Next Frontier,
CBS NEWS (Dec. 16, 2014, 5:00 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/evolution-of-thephone-from-the-first-call-to-the-next-frontier/ [https://perma.cc/7729-BGZW].
See generally id.; Madrigal, supra note 13 (describing the year-over-year increase in
robocalls as “staggering” from 2015-2018).
van Zuylen-Wood, supra note 23.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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hoping that someone would answer and listen to their pitch. 106 However,
after the creation of the Registry, a telemarketer was subject to
punishment for violating the TCPA if they made a call to a number on
the “Do Not Call” list.107 So, for a while, the Registry was effective at
deterring telemarketers from placing calls to listed numbers because
telemarketing companies wanted to avoid penalties for breaking the law.
But the robocallers of today are very different from the human
telemarketers of the early 2000s. Although there may be a person
causing an automatic system to make robocalls, identifying that person
is extraordinarily difficult because their identity and location are
shielded by modern autodialing technology.108
In 2020, the FTC collected over 3.9 million complaints from people
whose numbers are listed on the Registry but received unwanted calls
anyway.109 Even government officials admit they’ve disconnected their
landline phones because the Registry does not work. 110 Thus, the
Registry could not keep up with the late 2000s robocall revolution, and
the government was forced to explore other options on how to curb
them.111
B. Modern FCC Robocall Prevention Guidelines
After the FTC’s Registry failed, the FCC was tasked with
distributing guidelines designed to help people protect themselves from
robocalls.112 The FCC guidelines encourage consumers to, inter alia,
ignore calls from unknown numbers, download apps to block unwanted
calls, talk to their phone carriers about spam blocking options, and add
their numbers to the Registry.113 These measures have been somewhat
useful; spam call blocking apps, like RoboKiller®, TrueCaller®, and
YouMail®, for example, are effective at blocking unknown callers from
successfully getting through to the recipient.114 However, although
some of the FCC’s guidelines may be helpful, a great deal of their
106
107
108
109

110
111
112
113
114

Id.
Id.
Id.
National Do Not Call Registry Data Book for Fiscal Year 2020, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Oct.
2020),
https://www.ftc.gov/reports/national-do-not-call-registry-data-book-fiscal-year2020 [https://perma.cc/2U3Y-KLMQ].
See van Zuylen-Wood, supra note 23.
Id.
See Unwanted Robocalls, supra note 9.
Id.
See Lance Whitney, How to Block Robocalls and Spam Calls, PCMAG (Dec. 17, 2021),
https://www.pcmag.com/how-to/how-to-block-robocalls-and-spam-calls
[https://perma.cc/7MT4-3LR3].
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guidance is difficult to follow, and for most Americans, their advice is
downright confusing.
Firstly, the FCC’s advice encouraging people to add their numbers
to the national “Do Not Call” Registry is not helpful. The Registry does
not stop people from receiving robocalls.115 Secondly, senior citizens
and people with cognitive disabilities are less likely to comprehend the
FCC’s guidelines.116 Many seniors, who were not raised with today’s
complex communication technologies, do not understand how to install
spam blocking apps on their phones and may require further
clarification or assistance from others to do this. 117 Even if people are
successful at downloading robocall blocker apps, they may find that the
apps work too well—they also block calls that people should be
answering, like calls from coworkers, schools, and legitimate
businesses.118 Lastly, FCC guidance that encourages people to ignore or
block calls from unknown numbers starkly contradicts simultaneous
guidance from other agencies that instruct people to do the complete
opposite.119 The conflicting guidance has become apparent over the
course of the COVID-19 pandemic.120
During the past two years, state health departments have pleaded
with the public to answer their phones.121 COVID-19 contact tracers
frequently make unsolicited calls to inform people of positive cases,
track close contacts, gather data regarding symptoms, and encourage
vaccinations.122 These calls are being made for the purpose of
preventing the virus from spreading, and in furtherance of public safety,
which includes protecting high risk populations from contracting it.123
But the efforts of contact tracers are often made in vain because people
are doing exactly what the FCC told them to do: not answer calls from
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See discussion supra Part III-A.
See discussion supra Part I and sources cited supra notes 18, 25.
See discussion supra Part I and sources cited supra notes 18, 25.
See generally Why Are My Business Calls Being Blocked or Flagged as Spam?, CALLER
ID REPUTATION (Feb. 3, 2021), https://calleridreputation.com/blog/why-are-my-businesscalls-being-blocked-or-flagged-as-spam [https://perma.cc/4PPA-WA7F].
See generally Benjamin Siegel et al., Coronavirus Contact Tracers’ Nemeses: People Who
Don’t Answer Their Phones, ABC NEWS (May 15, 2020, 4:00 AM), https://abcnews.go.
com/Health/coronavirus-contact-tracers-nemeses-people-answer-phones/story?id=706
93586 [https://perma.cc/XJR8-N2J9] (urging individuals to answer phone calls from local
boards of health).
Id. (discussing the challenges public health officials have had getting people to answer calls
in part because of “robocall fatigue”).
Id.
Id.
Id.

228

UMass Law Review

v. 17 | 212

unknown numbers and exercise caution when answering calls appearing
to be from government officials. 124
How can consumers be expected to answer calls from the
Department of Health, but exercise caution when answering calls from
other agencies because the number might be spoofed? 125 How can
people know for sure that a state health department call is legitimate?126
Accordingly, this advice creates confusion among consumers—
especially among the elderly—many of whom are already overwhelmed
with the responsibility of protecting themselves from a deadly virus, let
alone scam laden robocalls.127 Therefore, the FCC must either amend or
update their guidance to clarify how exactly their contradictory advice
can be reconciled in the age of COVID-19.128
Furthermore, while the FCC’s actions to prevent robocalls are
sometimes worthwhile, they are simply not enough to curb the high
volume of robocalls that Americans receive every day. That is not to say
that the FCC should abandon all of their initiatives; their guidance is not
completely wrong, but it must be expanded upon.129 For example, the
FCC should encourage people to talk to their elderly friends and family
about the dangers of phone scams and ask whether they need help
installing robocall blockers on their phones. 130 Moreover, if seniors or
disabled people do not have the capability to adequately protect
themselves in this way, then the FCC should provide comprehensive
assistance or other means to ensure these targeted groups understand the
risks of answering calls from unknown numbers. 131 Often, these tasks
124

125
126

127
128

129
130

131

Compare id. (discussing the frustrations that public health officials have had contacting
consumers), with Unwanted Robocalls, supra note 9 (discussing FCC strategies to stop
robocalls including not answering both calls from unknow numbers and personal
questions).
See generally Unwanted Robocalls, supra note 9.
Id. (suggesting consumers hang up after receiving calls purportedly from a government
agency before finding contact information for the agency and calling it to confirm the
previous caller’s identity).
Id.; see also Drash, supra note 32; Siegal et al., supra note 119.
See Megan Brown et al., Scotus Provides TCPA Clarity by Rejecting Expansive Autodialer
Definition, JDSUPRA (April 6, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/scotus-provides
-tcpa-clarity-by-7946751/ [https://perma.cc/29M2-GBY9] (arguing that many issues still
exist related to the TCPA despite the Facebook decision).
See generally Combating Spoofed Robocalls, supra note 10.
See Unwanted Robocalls, supra note 9 (listing consumer tips to stop unwanted calls
although the FCC’s advice to educate targeted populations is notably missing); see also
Coronavirus Scams Targeting Older Americans, FED. COMMC’N. COMM. (Feb. 2, 2021),
https://www.fcc.gov/coronavirus-scams-targeting-older-americans
[https://perma.cc/B8H5-JMXU] (acknowledging that older Americans should be aware of
robocall-related scams, but not directly encouraging people to talk to their at-risk relatives).
See generally FED. COMMC’N. COMM’N, supra note 130.
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fall on caregivers who do not have the means to access their patients’
devices or are not authorized to communicate with phone carriers or
purchase apps on behalf of their patients or loved ones. 132 Fortunately,
the FCC has recently enacted an additional measure designed to
decrease the number of robocalls that people receive, called the
STIR/SHAKEN framework.133 The 2021 mandate does not put the
burden on the consumer—rather, it requires telephone carriers to take
initiative in the fight against robocalls.134
C. The STIR/SHAKEN Framework
The Secure Telephone Identity Revisited (STIR) and Signaturebased Handling of Asserted Information Using toKENs (SHAKEN)
framework (STIR/SHAKEN) requires phone carriers to authenticate the
identification of a caller before the call even reaches the consumer’s
phone.135 The new FCC requirement “erodes the ability of callers to
illegally spoof a caller ID,” a favorite tool of robocallers, which masks
the caller’s true identity and tricks people into answering a call. 136
According to the FCC, if a call does not originate from a
STIR/SHAKEN compliant provider, then the call will be blocked. 137
The framework operates by requiring carriers to attest to the
legitimacy of a caller’s identity, or risk having calls originating from
their networks be terminated or blocked for failure to comply, which
would negatively impact the phone company’s business.138 After
STIR/SHAKEN went into effect in June 2021, the number of robocalls
received that summer dropped by 29% when compared to June-August
2020, and STIR/SHAKEN is credited with causing the decline.139
Unfortunately, although it appeared that STIR/SHAKEN was off to a
132
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See generally Leslie Kernisan, 10 Things to Know About HIPPAA & Access to a Relative’s
Health Information, BETTER HEALTH WHILE AGING, https://betterhealthwhileaging.net/
hipaa-basics-and-faqs-for-family-caregivers [https://perma.cc/LQ23-N34L] (“The decision to override an older person’s decision or preferences is a serious one, and should only
be considered under special circumstances.”).
See Combating Spoofed Robocalls, supra note 10.
Id.
Id.
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STIR/SHAKEN: The Call Authentication Framework, NUMERACLE, https://www.numeracl
e.com /resources/stir-shaken-center [https://perma.cc/GSY4-K773].
See FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, FCC-CIRC2003-01, REPORT AND ORDER AND FURTHER
NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING (2020) [hereinafter FCC REPORT AND ORDER]; see also
id.
William Pitts, Scam Robocalls Drop 30% with New FCC Mandate, 12News (Oct. 11, 2021,
5:35 PM), https://www.12news.com/article/news/investigations/robocalls/scam-robocallsdrop-30-with-new-fcc-mandate/75-db058d1e-fbdf-4a89-98d9-9a35d435d4be
[https://perma.cc/P5FJ-QFK9].
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promising start, the regulation ultimately has not provided an adequate
solution for protecting the targeted community. 140
The FCC asserted that STIR/SHAKEN would “protect American
consumers from fraudulent robocall schemes,” but Americans received
more than four billion additional robocalls in 2021 when compared to
2020—even with STIR/SHAKEN in place. 141 But to be fair,
STIR/SHAKEN has not yet been fully implemented because the FCC
granted extensions to carriers who did not execute the new framework
by the June deadline.142 Thus, the effectiveness of the mandate is
uncertain at this time, and more data is needed in order to determine
how successful STIR/SHAKEN actually is at reducing robocalls. Even
so, the STIR/SHAKEN framework is focused on preventing robocalls
only—not automated text messages, which are also prohibited by the
TCPA.143
Consumer complaints regarding robotexts increased by almost
146% in 2020 compared to the previous year. 144 In response to the
growing number of complaints, the FCC recently acknowledged that
more needs to be done to stop unwanted texts. 145 In a press release dated
October 18, 2021, Acting Chairwoman Rosenworcel explained “[i]t’s
time we take steps to confront this latest wave of fraud . . . ” and
promised to explore a STIR/SHAKEN-esque authentication solution for
text messages.146 But because STIR/SHAKEN has proved ineffective at
considerably reducing robocalls to date, it is unclear how a similar
system would operate to reduce robotexts. 147
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YOUMAIL ROBOCALL INDEX, supra note 39; FCC REPORT AND ORDER, supra note 138, at
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20copy.pdf [https://perma.cc/WEH3-G2J9]; see also FCC REPORT AND ORDER, supra note
138, at 3.
Buchwald, supra note 69.
Becky Sullivan, Complaints About Spam Texts Were Up 146% Last Year. Now, the FCC
Wants to Take Action, NPR (Oct. 19, 2021, 12:48 PM), https://www.npr.org/
2021/10/19/1047303425/complaints-about-spam-texts-fcc-robocalls [https://perma.cc/5U
FW-GHYE].
See Press Release, Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, Acting FCC Chair Rosenworcel Proposes
Rules to Combat Rise of Robotexts (Oct. 18, 2021), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attac
hments/DOC-376657A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/RZE5-X3SG].
Id.
YOUMAIL ROBOCALL INDEX, supra note 39; see also U.S. PIRG EDUC. FUND, supra note
142 (comparing the impact of full and partial implementation of STIR/SHAKEN as well
as other options that phone companies may try and stating that perhaps there is no solution).
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Regardless, STIR/SHAKEN is undoubtedly a step in the right
direction. The mandate shows that the United States government takes
the threat of robocalls seriously and is currently and actively working
on exploring solutions to the problem.148 Yet, even if it is shown that
STIR/SHAKEN does reduce the number of robocalls, the reduction may
only be slight; in the meantime, Americans continue to receive billions
of robocalls and texts every year with the new mandate in place.149
Therefore, more must be done in order to stop unwanted calls and text
messages and protect telephone consumers. The United States may
benefit from adopting similar solutions from other countries in order to
curb fraudulent robocall schemes.
IV. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
A. Expand Identification Requirements Under STIR/SHAKEN
Many countries mandate a phone number user registration. China,
Japan, Brazil, Australia, and Germany—to name a few—require that
phone numbers be assigned to a person’s legally given name. 150 In 2013,
for example, China began requiring that all SIM cards be registered to a
user’s legally given name, as proven by the user’s legal identification
documents.151 Three years later, the Chinese government credited the
SIM card registration requirement with leading to the shutdown of over
half a million unregistered service lines and the removal of almost 2,000
number spoofing technologies.152 With regulations like these in mind,
the United States should consider adopting stricter identification
requirements similar to China’s in order to decrease robocalls and
increase consumer protection.153 Still, Americans probably won’t be
handing over their driver’s licenses, passports, or birth certificates, just
to upgrade their phones any time soon.
In the United States, there is little support for mandated phone user
registration based on proof of legal identification.154 Generally,
opponents of mandatory identification registration are concerned that
such a mandate denies access to essential communication equipment for
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See FCC REPORT AND ORDER, supra note 138.
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people who cannot provide legally sufficient proof of identification. 155
One may look to the current movement in favor of mandatory voter
identification laws to demonstrate Americans’ reluctance to be
subjected to identification registration requirements. 156
In America, citizens are not always required to present proof of
citizenship in order to vote in elections. 157 The policy behind this rule is
that some citizens would be prevented from exercising one of their most
fundamental rights simply because they did not possess legal proof of
identification.158 This issue made headlines recently because of
widespread claims of voter fraud following the 2020 presidential
election.159 Proponents of mandatory voter identification laws argue that
requiring identification to vote may lessen instances of voter fraud. 160
However, opponents of mandated voter identification requirements
claim that citizens’ right to vote would be hindered because they may
not have proof of identification, and that the restriction would
essentially be a form of voter suppression. 161
Hence, if Americans are hesitant to obtain identification to vote,
then they are probably not going to willingly accept a mandatory
identification requirement just to buy a SIM card. 162 If STIR/SHAKEN
proves ineffective at restraining them, then the nation may find that a
stricter identification regime to reduce robocalls would outweigh the
concerns.163 Accordingly, America should consider executing stricter
identification requirements to prevent instances of robocall fraud. 164
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B. Ban the Sale of Personal Data
There is an issue in the Facebook v. Duguid case that was left out
from the previous discussion: how exactly did Facebook get Mr.
Duguid’s number?165 The Supreme Court found that because “a user”
gave Facebook his number, Mr. Duguid had implicitly consented to be
contacted by them.166 But Mr. Duguid steadfastly maintained that he did
not give Facebook his number or consent to their two-step security
function.167 So who did?
Though not addressed in the case, it’s possible that Mr. Duguid’s
personal phone number was picked up by a “data broker.” 168 Data
brokers make huge profits from selling phone numbers and other
personal information to a variety of companies. 169 People unwittingly
give companies permission to sell data all the time by agreeing to a
buried clause in a website’s terms and conditions.170 The terms are
usually in print so small that no one ever reads them, if they can even
find them.171 Also, many sites require the user to allow them to collect
computer “cookies” that track the user’s internet itineraries to access the
site; if the user does not agree to the collection of cookies, they cannot
enter the site.172 The data is then collected and sold to a whole host of
companies—including Facebook—for the purpose of tracking personal
information, generating targeted ads, and producing more revenue via
advertising.173 Often, people are not aware that their personal data is
being bought and sold by companies, but those who are in the know
understandably desire more privacy over their personal information.
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The data privacy movement is nothing new; Europe enacted the
restrictive General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in 2018,
effectively making it illegal to share the personal data of anyone without
their express permission.174 The United States should consider adopting
similar data privacy regulations to potentially decrease robocall abuse.
By outlawing the sale of phone numbers and personal information
without the express permission of the owner, robocallers would have
less access to personal phone numbers. 175 People generally feel more
comfortable sharing personal data with GDPR in place because they
have more control over how their information is used. For example,
residents of countries that follow GDPR may choose to opt out of
sharing their personal information with third-parties like data brokers.
This means that some people are less inclined to agree to share personal
information, like their phone number, because they have the option not
to.176 Therefore, theoretically it is less likely that a phone number will
end up in a stored database, like Facebook’s two-step security system,
in countries that follow the GDPR.
That being said, the number of robocalls placed in Europe continues
to increase, regardless of the GDPR framework. 177 Presumably, similar
to the ATDS dilemma in the United States, robocalling technology
evolves at a quicker pace than the restrictions placed upon them on the
global scale as well.178 However, if the United States had a similar
framework in place, perhaps Mr. Duguid’s number would never have
been accessible to Facebook’s notification system, which did not
randomly generate his phone number, but merely stored it. If American
consumers had more protections like GDPR over their personal data,
maybe Facebook would not have had Mr. Duguid’s phone number
stored in their database.

174
175
176

177

178

See generally Commission Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119/1) (EU) [hereinafter
GDPR].
See Rosen, supra note 168.
See Rob Sobers, A Year in the Life of the GDPR: Must-Know Stats and Takeaways,
VARONIS (Jun. 17, 2020), https://www.varonis.com/blog/gdpr-effect-review [https://perm
a.cc/KW95-GL2G] (detailing the mixed feelings that many consumers have about the
GDPR).
See The Curse of the Robocalls Around the World, NEURAL TECHNOLOGIES,
https://www.neuralt.com/the-curse-of-robocalls-around-the-world/
[https://perma.cc/EG6Q-XSAG] (detailing a 2018 study that revealed the prevalence of
robocalls around the globe).
See generally Zuylen-Wood, supra note 23 (asserting that robocallers determined how to
work around the barriers set by the National Do Not Call Registry).

2022

Rage Against the Machine

235

CONCLUSION
Even though most Americans support putting an end to all robocalls,
it doesn’t look as if they’re going away any time soon. But this could
change. The country, as a whole, can rage against the machine. A
collaborative approach could put an end to this nightmare faced by so
many Americans. By calling on the Supreme Court to broaden the scope
of the TCPA, tasking agencies with clarifying and expanding upon their
guidance, strengthening STIR/SHAKEN authentication requirements,
and placing restrictions on data brokers, the number of robocalls
received by American consumers could significantly decrease. Above
all, if the United States can successfully regulate robocallers, then senior
citizens or people living with cognitive impairments are less likely to be
scammed and victimized by robocall fraudsters. For the first time since
the dawn of robocallers, people may actually feel sufficiently protected
from them. And just maybe, people will want to answer their phones
again.

